Category: Defence

Source: United States Department of Defense

As part of the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) initiative Project Pele, the Department of Defense (DOD) has awarded a contract option to X-energy, LLC of Rockville, Maryland in order to develop an enhanced engineering design for a transportable micro nuclear reactor.
In 2022, SCO selected BWX Technologies, Inc. of Lynchburg, Virginia to build a prototype micro reactor. This work is underway and long lead hardware fabrication has begun. By executing this contract option with X-energy, SCO seeks to develop a complementary micro reactor design that builds upon X-energy’s developments completed under Project Pele in 2022. This option continues funding for X-energy to develop its design to meet the technical requirements of Project Pele, targeting a reactor design which is ready for licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for both commercial ventures and military resiliency.
“Due to their extraordinary energy density, nuclear reactors have the potential to serve multiple critical functions for meeting resiliency needs in contested logistical environments,” said Dr. Jeff Waksman, Project Pele program manager. “By developing two unique designs, we will provide the Services with a broad range of options as they consider potential uses of nuclear power for both Installation and Operational energy applications in the near future.”
The DOD uses approximately 30 Terawatt-hours of electricity per year and more than 10 million gallons of fuel per day—levels that are only expected to increase due to anticipated electrification of the vehicle fleet and maturation of future energy-intensive capabilities. A safe, small, transportable nuclear reactor would address this growing demand with a resilient, carbon-free energy source that does not add to the DOD’s fuel needs, while supporting mission-critical operations in remote and austere environments.
This contract option for one year of work by X-energy will not result in a completed engineering design, but will allow a thorough analysis of design options, leading to a Preliminary Engineering Design and initiation of a regulatory preapplication process.
“The Strategic Capabilities Office specializes in adapting commercial technology for military purposes,” said Jay Dryer, SCO director. “By nurturing and developing multiple micro reactor designs, SCO will not just provide options for the military Services, but will also help jumpstart a truly competitive commercial marketplace for micro reactors.”

Source: United States Department of Defense

BRIGADIER GENERAL PAT RYDER: All right. Well, good afternoon, everyone. Today, it’s my honor to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy Mieke Eoyang as we make public an unclassified summary of the 2023 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, which will be posted on the DOD website this afternoon.
Secretary Eoyang will provide some opening remarks and then take some questions, which I will moderate, and I would respectfully ask that you keep your questions relevant to the Cyber Strategy and keep your follow-ups limited to provide your colleagues a chance to ask any questions. Afterwards, the Secretary will depart the briefing room and I will take the podium to provide some separate DOD updates and answer any questions you may have. 
And with that, over to you, Secretary Eoyang.
DASD FOR CYBER POLICY MIEKE EOYANG: Thank you, General Ryder. Good afternoon, everyone. As he mentioned, I am Mieke Eoyang, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy and I’d like to take a few minutes to provide an overview of the Defense Department Cyber Strategy summary being released today.
This unclassified strategy represents the overarching priorities of the classified 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy, which DOD transmitted to Congress this past May. This strategy builds upon the direction set by the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy and is informed by years of real-world experience of significant DOD cyberspace operations.
It’s the department’s fourth Cyber Strategy and represents the Secretary’s vision for operationalizing the 2022 National Defense Strategy in cyberspace. It also compliments the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy and the National Cybersecurity Strategy released last year.
This strategy draws from our experience conducting offensive and defensive operations. It’s also informed by DOD’s close observation of the Russia-Ukraine War and the integration of cyber into large-scale military operations, which is to say this is not an aspirational document, it reflects hard-won lessons and truths.
As mentioned upfront, this unclassified summary is intended to present the overarching priorities for the strategy and should not be considered exhaustive. The scope of this document is limited to the cyber domain. It does not establish policy for the department’s operations in the information environment.
I’d like to highlight the key elements of this strategy as captured in the summary. First, it identifies the People’s Republic of China as the department’s pacing challenge in the cyber domain and recognizes the significant threat that Russia poses in cyberspace. It also identifies other persistent threats, from the Democratic People’s Republic of China, Iran, and transnational criminal organizations, to include ransomware gangs, cyber thieves, and hacktivists.
Second, it establishes the role of cyberspace operations in integrated deterrence, which is employing cyberspace operations in concert with other instruments of national power, especially in defending the homeland and ensuring the resilience of the Joint Force.
Third, it outlines how the department will continue campaigning in cyberspace — which is the conduct of and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives intended to reinforce deterrence and frustrate adversaries.
Fourth, it provides a blueprint for building enduring advantages in cyberspace, overseeing investments across the defense ecosystem.
And fifth, and distinct from previous iterations of the DOD Cyber Strategy, this strategy commits to building the cyber capability of global allies and partners and to increase our collective resilience against cyberattack. 
Allies and partners are a strategic advantage that no competitor can match. Adversaries continually attempt to undermine the capabilities of our partners, and it’s in our interests to strengthen the network defense of our allies and partners. This strong network of allies and partners boosts our reach and capabilities and protect us in cyberspace.
Finally and importantly, this strategy emphasizes the department will continue to collaborate with our domestic partners across the federal government to share best practices and expertise. We will deepen our relationship with private industry through voluntary and timely information sharing.
In closing, as the cyber domain has grown, foreign adversaries have exploited it to identify U.S. vulnerabilities, commit espionage, steal intellectual property, violate U.S. sovereignty, and recently, to wage war. 
The department has long recognized the dangers inherent in the cyber domain and has maintained efforts to protect its own system. The new strategy establishes how the department, with a robust and integrated cyber capability, will operate in and through cyberspace to protect the American people and work to deter conflict where it can and prevail where it must.
Thank you.
GEN. RYDER: Thank you, Secretary Eoyang. We’ll now take some questions. First, we’ll go to AP on the phone, Lita Baldor.
Q: Hi, thanks a lot. Two quick questions for you if possible. 
Number one, could you tell us in your perspective, what the key lesson learned from Ukraine and Russia’s activities has been?  What is the primary lesson you’ve learned?
And then secondly, we’ve heard a lot for years about the shortage of cyber experts within the department and efforts to find people who you could sort of hire away while competitive companies are paying more. Can you give us a – bit more detail on how deep this shortage is and whether you’re far — the department is falling further behind or if this is getting any better?  
Thank you.
MS. EOYANG: Thank you for that. First, on Russia-Ukraine and the main lesson learned here, it’s that I think prior to this conflict, there was a sense that cyber would have a much more decisive impact in warfare than what we experienced. 
What this conflict has shown us is the importance of integrated cyber capabilities in and alongside other warfighting capabilities, and that is consistent with the approach in the NDS on integrated deterrence and is an important lesson for us to think about, that cyber is a capability that is best used in concert with those others and may be a limited utility when used all by itself.
To the second question on the shortage of workforce, I’m not going to get into specifics about numbers but it is a recognition of the department that people are essential to our capability in cyber, which is why we talk about cyber forces as the number one critical enabler in the context of the defense cyber strategy, and our focus on making sure that we are getting the people part right is a key line of effort for us in this strategy.
GEN. RYDER: Thank you, ma’am. We’ll come into the room here. Oren?
Q: Two questions. I’m going to quote from the unclassified strategy: “The department will also use cyberspace operations for the purpose of campaigning, undertaking actions to limit, frustrate and disrupt adversaries’ activities below the level of armed conflict and to achieve favorable security conditions.”  First, what do you mean — and could you describe cyberspace operations as part of campaigning?  And then how do you define favorable security conditions?  And then my other question is, it repeatedly talks about defense forward. What is that? Is that a euphemism for offensive cyber operations? Because there’s nothing about offensive cyber ops and that must be part of the strategy.
MS. EOYANG: Yeah. Let me answer the second part first, which is that on defend forward, and as we talked about in the 2018 cyber strategy, as we talk about defend forward and the recognition that we cannot simply defend our way out of a problem. There is a recognition that we will, as the department, need to disrupt adversary cyber — malicious cyber activity coming at the United States, and we have been doing so. And we do that not only as the Department of Defense, but as part of an integrated effort with our interagency colleagues. So yes on that one.
On your — sorry. Can you repeat the first question?
Q: Yeah. The de- — I’ll read the quote again…
“The department will also use cyberspace operations for the purpose of campaigning.” Can you just kind of define what that means…
MS. EOYANG: Yeah. 
Q: … or what that looks like?
MS. EOYANG: Yeah. So to go back to a phrase that we used in the 2018 cyber strategy, which I think underlies this campaigning concept here, we talked about persistent engagement here. One of the challenges is that the cyber domain is one that is constantly being updated, patched, modified as technology changes. So in — outside of an armed conflict, there is a need for us in the department to remain engaged with the cyber domain to be able to deny adversaries at — advantageous positions for themselves within the cyber domain. 
GEN. RYDER: Thank you very much. We’ll go back now to the phones. Georgina from Inside Defense?
Q: Hi. Thank you very much for this briefing. For my question, the strategy mentioned that to strengthen the DIB, the department plans to prioritize new technologies. What areas will these new technologies be focused on?
MS. EOYANG: Yeah, thank you for that question. I’m not going to get into the specifics of particular technologies, but I would just say that as we have seen adversary tactics and techniques change and evolve, there are technologies as we think about as part — for example, of zero-trust architecture that would enable us to better identify malicious and anomalous behavior on DOD networks, and we are interested in the development of those technologies, among others.
GEN. RYDER: OK, and we’ll go to Mark from Defense Scoop.
Q: Hi. Thanks so much for doing this. Two related questions, I believe. Through operations and observations of conflict, has DOD essentially come to the conclusion that cyber is really a tool that’s best suited for the gray zone, this competition phase short of conflict? And I guess relatedly, how do you see cyber operations contributing to kinetic forces and capabilities meeting the timing and tempo of commanders in the physical realm?
MS. EOYANG: I think that for the — as this strategy identifies, this is not just a gray-zone activity; that it also has — plays a role in the conflict itself. We have seen and observed, I think as you have all reported, that there have been cyber disruptions occurring in conflict, and that those can play a role in warfighting capability in the department. It intends to use them that way. I’m not going to get into specifics about particular operations.
GEN. RYDER: And we have time for a couple more. Any in the room here? Yes, sir?
Q: Just wanted to clarify your comments about engagement with commercial companies. It’ll be voluntary and timely information sharing. Is that kind of the extent of it, or is there going to be more engagements and more kind of cooperation?
MS. EOYANG: Yeah, thank you for the question. I think that phrase comes from a particularly important part of the defense cyber strategy, which is how we think about defending the homeland. We are recognizing that there are very sophisticated network owners and operators inside the United States. The Department of Defense’s authorities are pointed outside the United States, but we can enable those network owners and operators to better defend themselves. 
You have seen the department engaging those efforts as part of the whole-of-government Shields Up activities, where we are able to provide information to the private sector about what kinds of threats they might see. You have seen the department lean into providing cyber security warnings for the private sector with our domestic partners, the FBI and CISA, and we continue to provide technical assistance on a voluntary basis through NSA’s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. We recognize that this model is a productive one for the Department of Defense.
GEN. RYDER: OK, last two questions will go to Lara, and then onto the phone for the last question.
Q: Yeah, thanks for doing this. Two questions quickly. One, is there going to be some kind of implementation plan released in the near future that lays out sort of the detailed goals for the cyber strategy? I know you did that for the cyber workforce strategy, as well.
MS. EOYANG: Yeah, that will be a — something that we will have to work through in the Department of Defense. As you can tell by the lag between the classified strategy and the unclassified strategy, the process of providing something to the public may take us a little bit of time.
Q: And then secondly, what is your stance on the necessity of a cyber force?
MS. EOYANG: Yeah, any model the Department of Defense uses has pros and cons to it, the current model and the cyber force model. Congress has asked us to look at our model and alternative models of force generation. We are taking that report very seriously. I think it would be premature to say at this point whether or not a cyber force model is the right answer for the Department of Defense, given all that we’ve been able to accomplish on the current model, and I think we need to understand the implications of such a model before we were to take a position on that.
GEN. RYDER: Thank you. And final question will go to Alexandra, Federal News Network.
Q: Yeah, thanks. To build on the staffing, most of the ideas that it looked like were in the summary were things that we kind of heard before. Are there new ways to bring in more workers? Is there new funding? Is there enough funding for the kind of bonuses and programs that you’re looking to do?
MS. EOYANG: Yeah, it’s a really important question for us to think about how we are incentivizing the cyber workforce here, especially as we face competition from the private sector. It is part of the study that we are undertaking to be able to better understand our human capital requirements.
GEN. RYDER: All right. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. That is all the time the secretary has available today. Secretary Eoyang, thanks so much for joining us.
All right, so just a few things to pass along at the top, and then we’ll get right to your questions. Again, I want to thank Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Eoyang for taking some time today to provide details on DOD’s cyber strategy.
So first, a quick update on Red Hill. Recently, the department notified Congress that defueling the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility in Oahu, Hawaii will not adversely impact DOD’s ability to support military operations in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command theater. The Defense Logistics Agency has taken actions to reposition fuel within the theater, where it can better support USINDOPACOM fuel requirements. This notification was in accordance with the FY23 NDAA, which required the Secretary of Defense to notify congressional defense committees prior to the department beginning the defueling process. 
With notifications complete, Joint Task Force-Red Hill is now scheduled to begin defueling the storage tanks on October 16. This achievement reflects the department’s ongoing commitment to defuel and ultimately close the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility while upholding our responsibility to ensure the readiness of our armed forces.
In other INDOPACOM news, acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ms. Sasha Baker will depart today for meetings and engagements in Hawaii, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore. During her trip, she’ll meet with leaders from INDOPACOM and the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, she’ll co-chair the fourth meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group with our Korean allies, and she’ll co-chair the Strategic Security Policy Dialogue with her Singaporean counterpart.
Secretary Baker’s engagements will serve to reinforce the DOD’s broader efforts to work with regional allies and partners to promote and ensure a safe, secure, and stable Indo-Pacific region. I’d encourage you to visit Defense.gov for updates on Secretary Baker’s travel this week.
Also taking place in the Pacific, Exercise Cartwheel ’23 started today in Fiji. This is an annual multilateral exercise co-sponsored by the U.S. Army Pacific and the Republic of Fiji military forces. Approximately 150 personnel from the U.S. Army will participate in Nausori Highlands Training Area — or excuse me, at Nausori Highlands Training Area.
Exercise Cartwheel includes maneuver exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and stability and support operations activities alongside the Republic of Fiji military forces and multinational partners from across the Oceania region. This exercise will strengthen alliances and partnership while generating readiness for crisis and conflict response, in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.    And finally, Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks met with the Defense Policy Board today on a closed, classified session. Both leaders briefed the board members on the current landscape of global security challenges and opportunities, sharing insights gleaned from their most recent travel to the Indo-Pacific region. 
The leaders thanked the board members for dedicating their time and expertise to provide independent and informed advice, opinions, and recommendations on matters concerning defense policy. And an unclassified readout from this month’s policies board will be published on Defense.gov.
And with that, I’m happy to take your questions. We’ll go first to AP, Lita Baldor.
Q: Hi, Pat. Thank you. I was wondering if the department has any new assessment on the Russia-North Korea meeting that is, you know, about to take place, was taking place? And if there is any new assessment on whether there’s been any aid exchanged at all between the two countries? Thank you.
GEN. RYDER: Yeah, thanks very much, Lita. I don’t have any specific updates to provide, other than, again, obviously we a meeting is to take place. Our understanding is that this will focus on arms negotiations. And again, we would call on North Korea to meet its previous stated public commitments not to supply weapons to Russia, which will only end up prolonging the unnecessary war in Ukraine. Thank you.
Go on to the room here. Lara?
Q: Thank you. Just wondering if you could tell us whether the U.S. plans to send additional cluster munitions to Ukraine?
GEN. RYDER: Thanks, Lara. I — so in terms of security assistance for Ukraine, I don’t have anything to announce today. Of course, when and if we do, we certainly will let you know. Thank you.
Oren?
Q: Just a quick follow-up on North Korea. Do you expect Kim Jong-un to — specifically to meet Vladimir Putin or is that unclear, whether that meeting will … 
(CROSS-TALK)
GEN. RYDER: Yeah, really, you know, I’d have to refer you to the DPRK and the Russians for the details of the meeting. I’m just not going to have a readout to provide.
Sir?
Q: There have been reports and speculation that a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine may have crashed in the Taiwan Strait, killing everyone onboard. Could the DOD comment on such reports?
GEN. RYDER: I don’t have any information on that. Thank you.
Q: Thank you.
GEN. RYDER: Go to the phone here. Jeff Schogol, Task & Purpose?
Q: Thank you. If Senator Tuberville doesn’t lift his hold by October 1st, the Vice Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff will serve as acting Chairman and Vice Chairman. Can you talk about what are some of the real world consequences of having one person fill that role in an acting capacity?
GEN. RYDER: Yeah, thanks, Jeff. So, you know, there’s many implications that you’ve heard us talk about. I mean, depending on the position, there could be certain authorities that can only be exercised by a Senate-confirmed leader. And of course don’t forget that the Department of Defense is a organization that operates literally 24/7 around the globe. 
So there’s both operational reasons and personnel sustainment reasons why we have deputies and vices, vice commanders, to ensure that we can effectively cover down on the multiple foxholes that we’re covering at any one time.
For example, the Vice Chairman has several roles and responsibilities in his own right, including leading the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, representing the military in National Security Council deputies meetings, co-chairing the Deputies Management Group, participating in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank, as well as many other issues focused on oversight and coordination of interdepartmental groups. So if you add the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that’s a lot for one person to cover from extended period of time. 
So again, this is something that we’re going to stay focused on. Over the course of this summer, the Secretary and his legislative team have engaged with Senate leadership and senators on both sides of the aisle, to include senators McConnell and Schumer. In addition, the department continues to engage Senator Tuberville’s office and recently had a meeting with his staff on this topic.
Now that the August recess is over, Secretary Austin continues to lean hard into this and plans to conduct additional calls with senators this week, and we’ll continue to speak out and urge Senator Tuberville to lift his holds that are putting our readiness and our national security at risk. Thank you.
All right, come back in the room. Yes, sir?
Q: Thank you, General. General, I have two questions. The first one regarding to the Libya flood, does the officials there ask the DOD for any kind of help?  And does — the DOD willing to assist Libya in this flooding that’s — you know, too many people have been dying.
GEN. RYDER: Yeah, certainly a terrible situation in Libya. We have not been asked for any support from Libya. Of course, we’ll continue to monitor the situation there.
Q: … my second question — yesterday, we heard from the State Department that Secretary Blinken will host his Chinese counterpart before the end of this year maybe. So could we, like, expect same thing happen here in DOD between Secretary Austin and his Chinese counterpart?  And how do you describe the relations, military-to-military, between DOD and the Chinese? And does the communications channels still exist between two armies?  Thank you.
GEN. RYDER: Yeah, sure. So as it pertains to a potential meeting, I don’t have anything to announce. As you know, we have, and continue to keep, the offer on the table in terms of communicating between Secretary Austin and his counterpart. And for all the reasons that we’ve talked about, to try to ensure that we prevent any type of miscalculation, and militaries the size of ours have a responsibility to ensure those open lines of communication. But as it relates to doing that, of course, we will continue to make those efforts. From our perspective, there’s nothing preventing that from happening.
Now, to answer your other question, is there open channels of communication? Yes, at multiple levels. However, of course, we think that it’s important to maintain communication at all levels, to include the highest levels of our militaries. Thank you very much.
Let me go to Mike.
Q: Yes, sir. Thanks, Pat. Despite — let’s stick with the Senator Tuberville issue for a second. Despite your football analogies and the chastisement from his fellow Republicans like Representative McCaul from Texas, Senator Tuberville doesn’t look like he’s going to budge as — I mean, he said that, like, today, I think. My question is this: So what’s more important to the secretary, getting these generals and admirals confirmed, or the — or subsidizing elective abortions for the troops?
GEN. RYDER: Yeah, so we’re not subsidizing abortions, just to be clear on that. What we’re doing is we’re providing equitable reproductive healthcare for all of our service members. The department does not pay for abor- — abortions. We don’t pay for in vitro. What this is doing — it’s facilitating access which a servicemember would have had previously, since it was — they could live in a state through — that they could receive those services, that they pay for their on their own. But again, if you are now assigned to a state where those types of services are not available, we’re not going to pay for those services, but what we will do is we will, just like we would if you were stationed overseas, get you to a place where you can then pay for those services. And again, this goes back to ensuring that there is equitable healthcare for these federal servicemembers across the board. So does that answer your question?
Q: No. I mean, then, what’s more important — I mean, however we — however you describe it…
GEN. RYDER: What’s most important, yeah.
Q: What’s more important…
GEN. RYDER: What’s most important for the secretary of defense?
Q: (inaudible).
GEN. RYDER: The senator?
Q: The secretary. 
GEN. RYDER: Well, what’s most important to the secretary of defense of the United States of America is ensuring that the United States military can protect and defend this nation, and that means having service members that receive the training, the equipment, the healthcare and all the services that are required in maintaining an operationally-ready force. And what we don’t want is a force of haves and have-nots where some people are going to have access and some people are not by virtue of where the military assign them. Period. 
All right, let’s see. We’ll go to any other questions here. We’ll go back out to the phone. All right, let’s go to Georgina, Inside Defense.
Did we lose the phone?  
OK. Any other questions here in the room?  All right, thanks very much, everybody. Appreciate it.

Source: United States Department of Defense

Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) released an unclassified summary of its classified 2023 Cyber Strategy.
The 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy, which DOD transmitted to Congress in May, is the baseline document for how the Department is operationalizing the priorities of the 2022 National Security Strategy, 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy. It builds upon the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy and will set a new strategic direction for the Department.
“This strategy draws on lessons learned from years of conducting cyber operations and our close observation of how cyber has been used in the Russia-Ukraine war,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb said. “It has driven home the need to work closely with our allies, partners, and industry to make sure we have the right cyber capabilities, cyber security, and cyber resilience to help deter conflict, and to fight and win if deterrence fails.”
The United States faces diverse, growing threats in cyberspace and the strategy outlines how DOD is maximizing its cyber capabilities in support of integrated deterrence and employing cyberspace operations in concert with other instruments of national power.
The strategy highlights DOD’s actions to invest in and ensure the defense, availability, reliability, and resilience of its cyber networks and infrastructure to support non-DOD agencies in their related roles and to protect the defense industrial base.
“Distinct from previous iterations, the strategy commits to increasing our collective cyber resilience by building the cyber capability of allies and partners.” Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber Policy Mieke Eoyang said. “It also reflects the department’s approach to defending the homeland through the cyber domain as well as prioritizing the integration of cyber capabilities into our traditional warfighting capabilities.”
The strategy is the fourth iteration for the Department, and the first to be informed by years of significant cyberspace operations. You can read the full summary on Defense.gov.

Source: United States Department of Defense

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Industrial Base Policy, through its Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) office, entered an agreement with Albemarle Corporation to support the expansion of domestic mining and production of lithium.
The $90 million agreement, entered into under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and utilizing funds appropriated by the Inflation Reduction Act, will help support Albemarle’s planned re-opening of their Kings Mountain, N.C. lithium mine to increase domestic production of lithium for the nation’s battery supply chain. Albemarle estimates that Kings Mountain will be operational between 2025 and 2030.
“The agreement with Albemarle demonstrates the DoD’s ongoing commitment to meeting the needs of our warfighter, today and in the future,” said Mr. Anthony Di Stasio, MCEIP Director. “This investment directly supports President Biden’s April 2022 Presidential Determination for Critical Materials in Large-Capacity Batteries.”
This agreement represents the continuation of the MCEIP five-year investment plan to secure supply chains for minerals and materials critical to the DoD and the commercial sector.  The DoD is committed to continuing to work with industry to ensure the continued availability of these essential resources.
About the Department of Defense’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) for developing Department of Defense policies for the maintenance of the United States defense industrial base (DIB), executing small business programs and policy, and conduction geo-economic analysis and assessments.  The office also provides the USD(A&S) with recommendations on budget matters related to the DIB, anticipates and closes gaps in manufacturing capabilities for defense systems, and assesses impacts related to mergers, acquisition, and divestitures.  IBP monitors and assesses the impact of foreign investments in the United States and executes authorities under sections 2501 and 2505 U.S.C. Title 10.

Source: United States Department of Defense

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Resilience, through its Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) office, entered an agreement with Talon Nickel (USA), LLC (Talon) to increase the domestic production of nickel.
The $20.6 million agreement, entered into under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and using funds appropriated by the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, advance nickel exploration and mineral resource definition of the Tamarack Intrusive Complex (TIC).
Nickel is an essential mineral input to produce high-temperature aerospace alloys, stainless steel, and chemicals for lithium-ion batteries. The United States has only one operating nickel-cobalt mine with a current, publicly announced life of mine extending through 2026.
“This is yet another example of the critical importance of the DPA investment authorities,” said Anthony Di Stasio, Director for MCEIP.”  “This award exemplifies the DoD’s commitment to strengthening the resilience of critical supply chains and lessening our reliance on foreign sources of vital materials.”
Talon has developed a proprietary suite of geophysical mapping tools, called its Advanced Exploration System (AES), which allows it to rapidly identify and demonstrate economically recoverable nickel minerals. In 2022, Talon deployed the AES at a pilot-scale and they were able to delineate new mineral resources within two additional zones of the TIC in less than one year.
About the Department of Defense’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Resilience
Industrial Base Resilience (IBR) works with domestic and international partners to force and sustain a robust, secure, and resilient industrial base enabling the warfighter, now and in the future.  The office identifies and addresses supply chain/industrial base vulnerabilities, enables production in key areas through investment and innovative acquisition strategies, and manages vulnerabilities presented by adversarial capital.  It also enables the health of the workforce through upskilling, training, and professional development opportunities.  IBR refines processes to improve effectiveness, coordination, and workload management, and cultivates relationships across the Department, interagency, and industry.

Source: United States Department of Defense

Department of Defense Spokesman Lt. Col. David Herndon provided the following readout:
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Sasha Baker met with Estonian Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Kusti Salm here at the Pentagon, September 8. 
The leaders discussed efforts to strengthen defense security cooperation and to advance shared interests and priorities, including NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in the Baltic region. 
Acting Under Secretary Baker thanked Permanent Secretary Salm for Estonia’s continued military assistance to Ukraine and reiterated the Secretary of Defense’s commitment to maintain persistent rotational presence in the Baltics. The leaders emphasized their steadfast commitment to Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Source: United States Department of Defense

BRIGADIER GENERAL PAT RYDER:  All right.  Welcome to Monday.  Just a few things at the top here and then we’ll get right to your questions.
So today of course marks the solemn occasion of the 22nd anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The remembrance events for those lost in New York City, Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and then the 184 lives lost here at the Pentagon commenced on Friday with a ceremony for Pentagon employees in the Pentagon courtyard.  And then today’s ceremonies here at the Pentagon began with an American flag unfurling at sunrise and continued with a reading of the names of those 184 killed on that day here at the Pentagon.
Secretary Austin and General Milley, as you know, delivered remarks at the Pentagon Memorial to honor those we lost and their families.  And then this afternoon, First Lady Dr. Jill Biden will attend a wreath laying here at the Pentagon with Secretary Austin and General Milley at 4:20 pm.
As Secretary Austin said in — in his remarks, the men and women of the Department of Defense will always remember, we will always honor the memory of our fallen teammates, and we will always strive to be worthy of the memory of those we lost.
Separately, Secretary Austin conducted an introductory phone call this morning with the new Ukrainian Defense Minister, Rustem Umerov.  The Secretary congratulated the Minister on his new position and reiterated our steadfast support for Ukraine.
Secretary Austin provided an update on U.S. security assistance efforts and exchanged views with the Minister on priorities to support Ukraine’s immediate battlefield needs and capability requirements over the long term.  If we haven’t already, we’ll be providing a readout on our website.  So you should have that very shortly.
On a related note, Secretary Austin will be hosting the next Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base on September 19th.  So we’ll have the opportunity to meet Minister Umerov in person during that event.
And as you know, the Contact Group brings together nearly 50 nations to discuss Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield needs, as well as the longer-term support required to maintain their defense and security.  And so we’ll have much more to provide on that in the coming days.
Finally, on an administrative note, both Sabrina and I will be attending the Contact Group next week.  So we’ll be out on Monday, so we won’t have a gaggle on Monday, but we will kick them back off again on the 25th of September and keep going every Monday from there.
So with that, I am happy to take your questions.  Lara?
Q:  Hey, Pat.  Just wondering about the ATACMS.  There was a report on Friday that the U.S. was likely to send them to Ukraine.  Just wondering if — if — even if there hasn’t been a final decision to send them, if that is something that, if there’s movement on now?
And also, there was reporting that they had found ATACMS missiles that could perhaps be upgraded and then sent to Ukraine that they hadn’t thought of before.  So can you just speak to that please?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, so I saw the press report on that.  Again, from a Department of Defense standpoint, we have nothing new to announce.  We will continue to maintain close contact with Ukraine and our allies and our partners on their security assistance needs.  So when and if there’s anything new to — to announce on that front, we certainly will, but as of today, I’ve got nothing new to provide.
Q:  Are there ATACMS that the DOD could potentially send?
GEN. RYDER:  Again, I’m not going to get into inventory levels or, you know, speculate on — on potential future options.  Of course, we’re going to work with Ukraine to provide them what they need to be successful.  So thank you.
Ashley?
Q:  I wanted to ask about reports on Bahrain and the Crown Prince is coming and a potential security agreement will be signed.  Could you sort of walk us through what that means for the Department of Defense, potentially force posture, et cetera?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, thanks, Ashley.  I — I just don’t have any information on that, so let me take that question and we’ll come back to you, okay?
Will?
Q:  Hi.  Two questions, one on — on Niger.  Any — have there been any further movements of — of U.S. forces?  And has the — has the move from Niamey to Agadez been completed at this point?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, thanks, Will.  So you should have received my note over the weekend just providing the status.  Again, no significant changes to the force posture there.  As — as Sabrina highlighted at the briefing on Thursday, we are, out of an abundance of caution, repositioning some forces from Niamey to Agadez.
I’m not going to get into the specifics, in terms of numbers or — or the timelines, other than to say broadly speaking our forces in country continue to remain there, paused in terms of, you know, training with the Nigerians, awaiting a diplomatic outcome for this.
So when we have significant updates to provide, we’ll be sure to do that.
Q:  And then on — on North Korea, North Korea said today that — that — basically confirmed that Kim Jong-un will meet with Putin, and South Korea’s state news agency reported that — that he’s departed.  Do you have any details on — on that or — or on the expected meeting?
GEN. RYDER:  We do expect some type of meeting.  And — and, you know, based on the information we’ve been provided, KJU is traveling to Russia, but as far as the details of that meeting and what will be discussed and when and where, I just don’t have any information to provide.
I would just again reiterate that we remain concerned that North Korea is contemplating providing any type of ammunition or materiel support to Russia, in support of their war against Ukraine, which, as you’ve heard us all say, that — that would really just serve to perpetuate this needless war and result in the death of innocent Ukrainians.
And so it’s something that we’ll continue to keep a close eye on but I’m just not going to have any further details at this point.
Yes, ma’am?
Q:  Do you have any updates on whether there’s going to be any DOD support for the Morocco earthquake recovery efforts?
GEN. RYDER:  As of right now — well, first — first of all, let me just say that — that we are all very saddened to see the extent of the devastation in Morocco.  Our thoughts and prayers certainly are — are with those that are affected.
As of right now, there’s been no request by the government of Morocco for DOD support.  We do have approximately 100 U.S. forces that are in country that are there for exercise planning not related to the — the current situation.  They’re all accounted for.
But again, you know, we’ll — we’ll continue to monitor this situation but we have not been asked to provide any support as of right now.  Thank you.
Liz?
Q:  On Senator Tommy Tuberville’s holds, does the Secretary have any plans to meet with him in person?  And are there any plans to say — go, like, the long way in the Senate of approving one by one for just, like, the top few officials?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, so — so when it comes to potential actions by the Senate, I mean, that’s really something for the Senate to talk about.  That’s, you know, way out — way outside of — of my lane, to talk about the potential —
(CROSSTALK)
Q:  — has the Secretary talked to Leader Schumer about that?
GEN. RYDER:  Again, Liz, I — you know, the Secretary has engaged with congressional leaders.  I’m — I’m not at liberty to go into the specific individuals that he’s spoken to, and — and of course would refer you to the Congress to talk about that.  I think he’s communicated, again, publicly and privately the impacts that these holds are having.
I’m not aware at this time of any scheduled meetings or phone calls.  If that changes, we’ll be sure to let you know.  Thank you.
Missy?
Q:  Pat, would it — going back to the ATACMS questions, would it be accurate to say that — I know you don’t have anything to announce — but is it accurate to say that the Defense Department still has reservations about the level — the American stockpile levels?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, so —
Q:  Now, I know it’s been rising, you know, with the, sort of, position and the reluctance to provide it in the past?
GEN. RYDER:  Thanks, Missy.  So what I would say is, you know, we’re — we’re never going to talk publicly about specific readiness levels and where we are in terms of inventory and things like that.  Any time we make a decision to provide any type of capability to Ukraine, or working with our allies on that front, as you’ve heard us say, we take into account the potential impact on readiness.  And we’re not going to do anything that would jeopardize our own military’s readiness in order to carry out our commitments worldwide.
So that is always part of the discussion before the secretary would approve or make a recommendation to the president to approve.  And so, as it relates to ATACMS, I’m just not going to go into the specifics on them.
Q:  And a corollary to that, maybe a question to take, would it be possible to get a list of countries to which the United States has sold ATACMS?
GEN. RYDER:  I can take the question.  You know, I’m — and the only reason I’m sounding hesitant is part of that is, when we do foreign military sales, of course there’s a process by which those are requested.  The State Department makes the recommendation.  The Congress approves.  There’s also an understanding, depending on certain countries, of what they will and will not announce publicly in that regard.
So we’ll take a look, and we’ll provide you what we can.
Okay, thank you. 
Q:  To go back to the Tuberville question, is DOD preparing for the possibility that General Milley’s retirement occurs before General Brown is confirmed by the Senate?
And what does that look like, and how can you see that play out?
GEN. RYDER:  Well, as of right now, General Milley’s retirement is scheduled for the 29th of September.  As you know, if the holds are not lifted by then and — and a chairman is not confirmed, then, as I understand it, the vice chairman would be the acting chairman and would be essentially serving in both roles as the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
So, okay?  Ryo?
Q:  Thank you.  The U.S. and Vietnam have agreed to upgrade their bilateral relationship to (inaudible) comprehensive strategic partnership at President Biden’s visit in Hanoi on the weekend.
So what does this mean for the bilateral defense cooperation with Vietnam and how significant is it to push back on China’s maritime reign in the South China Sea?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, thanks, Ryo.  So — so, as you know, we have a very good relationship, working relationship with Vietnam.  Let me come back to you, though, in terms of specifics as it pertains to outcomes from this particular meeting in defense cooperation.  I — I just don’t want to speculate from here.
Bill?
Q:  On Tuberville, is it possible, not for right now, but is it possible to get a sense of how much time the secretary has spent on this issue.  I mean, without saying who the phone calls are to, how many phone calls he’s made, you know, how many meetings he’s had, you know, whether or not it’s actually — it’s something that he thinks is a personal responsibility of his to resolve, or whether he thinks this is mainly an issue for Congress to resolve among itself, if you could understand that?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, no, thanks, Bill.  I mean, I would tell you that obviously this is something that the secretary is taking very seriously.  He has conducted three phone calls with Senator Tuberville.  You know, again, I’m not going to read out the specifics of those phone calls, other than to say, you know, the secretary communicated that these will have an impact on our readiness.
You’ve also heard him talk about it in public speeches on multiple occasions.  And as referenced before, our staff here on the legislative affairs side is engaged with members on the Hill and their offices, to include Senator Tuberville’s office, to communicate with the impacts are going to be.
You know, on any given day, the secretary of defense is engaged on a — a multiple number of issues on a wide variety of topics, but we do recognize that this is an important issue, and it’s one that he remains committed to trying to communicate what the impacts are going to be.
When it comes — when I talk about the Congress and — and what they need to do on this, again, that’s their legislative responsibility.  It’s not within the realm of the Department of Defense or the executive branch to tell legislators how to go about legislating.  And so — and I — and certainly, as a uniformed officer, I’m not going to stand here and — and suggest that other than, again, I would refer you to them to talk about how they want to address it on the Hill.
In the meantime, the department has serious work to do defending this nation.  We also have a responsibility to ensure that all our service members have equitable access to reproductive healthcare, and that is the basis for the policy that we have adopted which is legal according to the Department of Justice, so I’ll leave it at that.
Q:  I’m sorry.  Can I follow up?  I just want to understand why we can’t get any more specifics on what the secretary is doing.  If it’s a priority of readiness, the question is reasonable and just ask  (inaudible) —
GEN. RYDER:  I — I’m not sure that I — and then maybe I’m not communicating, but I mean, Nancy, I’m not going to have an hour-by-hour breakdown in terms of manhours other — and — and as a matter of protocol, we typically do not read out the secretary’s individual engagements on — with members of the Hill for all the obvious reasons — executive privilege — you know, and not executive privilege in this case, but just in — in the course of doing business —
Q:  I — I get the point, but just, you said that typically by — by the description, this is not typical; this is exceptional.  It’s hurting military readiness.  We’ve seen the services come out (inaudible).  They’ve gone on CNN.  All we’ve been told so far is that in any specifics, that he had a call in July.  So I just don’t understand.  The department keeps saying that this is a priority, that it’s a priority for the secretary, but can’t bolster that with any sort of details.  So I think — because we can’t get a list of names.  We’re just asking for some measure of what the department has made —
Q:  And he’s had dozens of calls with lawmakers.
Q:  Right.
Q:  He’s had 50 calls with… every day?
GEN. RYDER:  Okay, yeah.  I’ll — I will take that question.  I will take that question.
Q:  Yeah.
GEN. RYDER:  But again, I would — I would just kind of push back on the notion of — of putting the responsibility where it’s due.  And — and this isn’t Secretary Austin somehow trying to throttle back and just let this work its way out.  At the end of the day, there is a senator preventing three — now, 318 nominations from going forward, and that is going to continue to have an impact, and the longer those holds are in place, the more the impact will be felt, so — yeah.
Q:  Well, I get your point.  I would just say it’s also for the — it is the conversations he has between the civilian leadership, not with the uniformed.  And we’ve seen some of the civilian leaders come forward, and we’re just looking for some specificity on how —
GEN. RYDER:  Sure.  Okay.
Q:  — the secretary’s trying to address this.
GEN. RYDER:  Yup, gotcha.  No, understood.
Jeff?
Q:  Thanks very much. I was wondering a little bit about, with the exercise going on right now with Armenian forces and what Russian officials have said about it.  Could you talk a bit more about what the exercises are, how long that they were planned and — and what the plans are for additional exercises, perhaps, in — in that region?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, thanks, Jeff.  So I would — I would refer you to EUCOM.  They should be able to give you — I — I know they’ve put out some information on this particular exercise already.  But they can break it down.  As you know, we conduct a multitude of exercises throughout the — the EUCOM AOR, but they can get you the details on that.
All right, time for a couple more.  Oren?
Q:  Two quick questions.  One, has the F-16 pilot maintainer language training gotten to Lackland yet?  And the second question is there an update on Travis King?  Any official communications about his — his status or anything?
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, thanks, Oren.  I have no updates to provide on — on Private King.  To my knowledge, his status has not changed.
And then in terms of F-16 maintainer language training, let me take that and we’ll come back to you.
Q:  Thanks.
GEN. RYDER:  Okay?  All right, last question.  Yes, sir?
Q:  Thanks, Pat.  General Brown put out a memo today basically, the — instructing airmen to be on the lookout for Chinese members to convert them to spy for the Chinese.   Is this is a concern that’s shared more broadly at the OSD level?  And is there — you know, from your perspective, has there been anything that would motivate General Brown — like, has there been an uptick in Chinese efforts in this — in this area? 
GEN. RYDER:  Yeah, so I don’t — I don’t really have anything to add beyond General Brown’s letter.  I mean, certainly, as — as part of the — the training that we receive on operations security, and you know, particularly as you retire from the military, you know, you’re required to receive briefings in terms of what you can and can’t do when it comes to working for foreign governments.  So I — I think General Brown’s point was, again, to just flag that you have to keep your head on a swivel in terms of who’s asking you to do what, in light of the threat that China poses as — as the pacing challenge for the department.  Thank you.
All right, thanks very much, everybody.  Appreciate it.  Have a great day.

Source: United States Department of Defense

Thank you, General Milley.
Good morning, everyone.
I am absolutely honored to be here with all of you on this day of remembrance and resolve.
I’m especially moved to be here with family members of those who we lost, with survivors of the attacks, and with the first responders who raced to save innocent lives.
To the families and the loved ones of the 184 people who lost their lives on 9/11 here at the Pentagon and on Flight 77: let me extend my deepest condolences, on behalf of the Department of Defense.
I know that being here is hard. I know that it aches to remember this milestone year after year. And I know that nothing can make it right.
And as the years go by, it may feel that the world is moving on, or even forgetting what happened here on September 11th, 2001.
But please know this: The men and women of the Department of Defense will always remember.
We will always honor the memory of our fallen teammates.
We will always strive to be worthy of the memory of those we lost.
September 11th reminds us that the American spirit still shines in times of testing. After the attacks, amid the horror and the grief, many Americans felt a deeper sense of duty to their communities and to their country. 
And all around the country, with hearts breaking for the slain and the suffering, Americans looked within themselves and felt called to give back.
In those terrible first hours and days, people rushed to give blood, to volunteer in hospitals, or to hand out food and water to exhausted first responders. 
And here at the Pentagon, an outstanding group of employees and volunteers got a family-assistance center up and running in less than a day. Over the next month, over 2,500 people volunteered there. And so they worked long hours to serve hot meals, and provide counseling, and offer medical care, and help families through their grief.
You know, not every act of service was monumental. We remember a hug for a soldier on the streets of Manhattan, or a child’s handwritten thank-you card for a firefighter.
But every act of grace changed us, drawing out a strength and a sense of common purpose that became part of the story of that day—and part of the story of our country.
As the months and years went by, many Americans chose to help those in need or to fortify our security in a newly uncertain world.
September 11th made America a nation at war. And hundreds of thousands stepped up to serve our country in uniform. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have come to a close. But we remain relentlessly focused on combating terrorist threats to America.
And I want to thank all of my fellow veterans who served in combat during the two hard decades of war after 9/11—as well as their families—for all that they gave.
The courage and the compassion that we witnessed after September 11th were even more extraordinary when they came from Americans who lost loved ones.
I’m thinking today of Khang Nguyen, who was born in South Vietnam in a time of chaos. He finally made it to America with his family and eventually graduated from the University of Maryland with a degree in electrical engineering. And on 9/11, he was working as a systems administrator at the Navy Command Center right here in the Pentagon.
He left behind a beloved wife, Tu, and their four-year-old son, An.
Tu, who also worked for the Department, was devastated by her husband’s death. But she resolved to be strong to support their son. 
And so, twenty-two years later, Tu and An are incredibly close, and their tie has only grown stronger from the loss that they’ve endured. They talk every day. And she is so proud of the young man that An has become.
An still tries to make his dad proud, and to honor his legacy in ways big and small. That can mean echoing Khang’s love of learning, or taking up the guitar, or simply staying engaged with his community and finding ways to help others—just as his dad did. 
So in September 2021, on the 20th anniversary of 9/11, Tu visited this memorial to place flowers on the bench with her husband’s name on it. She felt a wave of sadness looking at the benches honoring other victims that were bare. So she called up a friend, and they came back here together, and they laid a rose on each of the 184 benches around us.
And so now, thanks to Tu’s simple act of kindness, every year on this day, the Department of Defense upholds that tradition, laying a rose on every bench to honor the memory of every soul taken from us here on 9/11.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are honored to have Tu and An here with us today. And I want to thank them—and all of the families of the fallen.
September 11th changed you forever.
But you changed us forever.
In so many ways, you turned grief into grit and sorrow into strength.
And you helped us to see beyond ourselves—and give back to our fellow Americans, and to deepen our democracy, and to work toward a stronger, safer future.
So it is our duty to carry out the missions that your loved ones chose.
It is our duty to live up to the goodness that they embodied.       
And it is our duty to defend the democracy that they loved so much.
So we will always seek to meet that challenge.
We will always strive to live up to their example and their memory.
We will always work to keep America safe.
And we will always, always remember.
May God bless you all. And may God continue to bless the United States of America.
Thank you very much.
[Applause]

Source: United States Department of Defense

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke by phone today with Ukrainian Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov to congratulate him on his appointment and to reiterate the steadfast U.S. support for Ukraine. Secretary Austin provided an update on U.S. security assistance efforts and exchanged views with Minister Umerov on priorities to support Ukraine’s immediate battlefield needs and capability requirements over the long term. Secretary Austin and Minister Umerov also discussed the agenda for the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting to be held next week at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.  The two leaders pledged to remain in close contact.

Source: United States Department of Defense

Department of Defense Spokesman Lt. Col. David Herndon provided the following readout:
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Sasha Baker met with Acting Defense Minister Martin Sklenar of Slovakia at the Pentagon, Sep. 7.
The leaders discussed the strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Slovakia, and Slovakia’s critical value as a NATO Ally and strategic partner for European security. The United States lauds Slovakia’s swift action in supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression and its progress in meeting the Defense Investment Pledge. The United States values Slovakia’s key contributions to the Alliance and knows Slovakia will continue to be an essential partner for long-term regional stability and security, not just for the Slovak people, but for all citizens of a free and democratic Europe.