Source: US Global Legal Monitor
In recent posts on this blog, I wrote about two early American lawyers who argued that a theory of natural law should be at the heart of the nation’s legal education. Those posts focused on the writings of James Wilson, one of the giants of the founding era, and David Hoffman, a remarkably learned lawyer from Baltimore who established the University of Maryland’s first school of law. As I wrote in one of those posts, natural law is the idea that people have basic rights and obligations by nature. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, they are implanted in us by “nature and nature’s God.” That idea, which was discussed widely among the founders of the United States, was part of an ongoing thread in legal and political thought in the West that had its roots in antiquity; it was represented by several distinct branches of thought even in the 18th century when Jefferson crafted the Declaration’s language. Both Wilson and Hoffman relied heavily in their work on the major authors of the Protestant branch of the natural law tradition, among whom were figures such as Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), Richard Cumberland (1631–1718), and Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744). In this post, I want to talk about another author that both Wilson and Hoffman relied on, one who exercised a broad influence on civic education in their time. That author is Thomas Rutherforth (1712-1771), the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge University and Archdeacon of Essex who wrote Institutes of Natural Law.
Thomas Rutherforth was born on October 3, 1712. Son of the rector of Papworth Everard (a village in Cambridgeshire, England), he was educated at Huntingdon School and later St. John’s College, Cambridge. There, in 1740, he completed a Bachelor of Divinity, the degree sought by aspiring leaders in the Anglican Church. While he had undergone extensive theological training, he also took serious interest in science, so much so that he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1742. He published scientific as well as church-related writings during his career.
Rutherforth went on to earn a Doctor of Divinity and in 1745 was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, a position that was created by Henry VIII in 1540 to anchor theological instruction in that university; it was in Rutherforth’s time – and it remains today – one of the most prestigious academic appointments in theology in the United Kingdom. Rutherforth supported the latitudinarianism that was dominant in Church leadership, a movement that began in the 17th century and that viewed differences in non-essential matters of belief with lenience. (Knudson, p. 312.) But at the same time, he supported the state’s right to require clergy to subscribe to the church’s formal statements of creed and practice (the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion). (See generally, Rutherforth, 1766.)
Among the many subjects that he studied, Rutherforth wrote several books and pamphlets about moral philosophy. His position emphasized God’s promise to reward the practice of virtue, an idea that some of his contemporaries, John Wesley (1703-1791), the founder of Methodism, for example, believed contradicted the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. (Rodell, pp. 1-78.) The British author and theologian Catherine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749) took issue also with Rutherforth’s view that personal salvation can be a motive for virtue, a characterization that she found too transactional. (Broad, pp. 7-8.) Rutherforth presented this view most forcefully in An Essay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue (Cambridge, 1744) arguing that practicing virtue is identical to self-interest because the actions that God has made man’s duty are also the actions that lead to human happiness, both on earth and in the afterlife.
Rutherforth continued working through his thoughts on moral obligations in his most important piece of writing on the law of nature, a book titled Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis, the first volume of which was published in London in 1754. In that book, Rutherforth presented, in a straightforward and relatively systematic way, summaries of some of the contents of Hugo Grotius’ classic on natural law and the law of nations, De Jure Belli et Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace).
The choice to comment on Grotius’ work was in some ways obvious. It was the most influential treatise on the law of nature in Europe; originally published in Latin in 1625, it had by Rutherforth’s time been printed many times, appearing in several dozen distinct editions in multiple languages, a number that expands significantly when all the variant imprints are considered. The work is credited with establishing the modern study of international law, but it had also become the launching point for most discussions of the law of nature in the Protestant world. (Tuck, pp. 78-79.) Natural law arguments had also become, by the middle of the 18th century, a staple of the liberal arts education in the leading universities in England and Scotland, a trend that also extended to the colonial colleges in North America; they were widely offered as a background theory for the moral training of young men at that time. (Knudson, p. 312.)
Rutherforth’s book was firmly in the vein of popularizing natural law theory. It stripped away a lot of the citations to Roman law and to Classical authors that weighed down Grotius’ text; it added a large amount of reasoned argumentation. Rutherforth also added his own thoughts to Grotius’ moral theory, including the prospect that the practice of virtue leads to individual happiness and eternal salvation. (e.g., Rutherforth, 1754, p. 11-14.) The first volume of Rutherforth’s work follows contents covered especially in the first two books of Grotius’ De Jure, discussions of the nature of law, especially the difference between natural law and positive law, the subjects of rights and obligations, of property and its acquisition, of rights that a man has in his own person, of rights of parenthood, of oaths, promises and contracts, and others. While Rutherforth’s first volume considers these topics from the point of view of natural law — those obligations that apply to people even when they are not part of any state or society — his second volume addresses the constitution of a state and its justification, the laws of a state, and the natural law conventions that govern the interaction of states.
The Institutes was well-received, especially in America. After the first edition of 1754/1756, the book was published again in 1779 (Cambridge, UK), in 1799 (Philadelphia), and then in 1832 (Baltimore). It was among the books that James Madison recommended for the use of Congress in 1783; it was mentioned by Luther Martin in the Constitutional Convention of 1787; Alexander Hamilton mentioned it in Federalist 84 and in his “Defense of the Funding System;” his book was cited by some of the giants of the field of law in the early Republic, including James Kent, Henry Wheaton and Joseph Story. (This list with its specific citations–and more–can be found here: McDowell, p. 60.)
As it happens, the Institutes relates to some of the questions that Jefferson raised in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence. As for a person’s right to life, Rutherforth argues that while one has a right to his life, this only extends to the power to do what is consistent with his duty. “No man,” he writes, “can have a right to manage his own person, or to dispose of it in such a manner, as will render him incapable of doing his duty.” (Rutherforth, 1832, p. 78.) He explains further that as for his life and limbs, “as they were given him to use … they are not his to abuse or dispose of.” (Rutherforth, 1832, p. 78.) Regarding personal liberty, Rutherforth holds that there is no such thing as a person who is a slave by nature. Human beings are by nature free. On the other hand, personal liberty, he writes, is alienable. One can sell oneself or one’s child into servitude (though not one’s neighbor, nor an enemy conquered in an unjust war), a state which he claims must be managed to respect the rights of both master and servant. (Rutherforth, 1832, pp. 238-245.) Rutherforth also acknowledges that natural law can justify acts of political resistance against tyrannical government, a notion critical to the Declaration. (Rutherforth, 1832, pp. 478-481.) The relation between subject and supreme governor, he writes, “is limited by the natural and revealed laws of God, by the laws of the national constitution, and by the ends of the union. [one] may, therefore, give them the name of governors, … likewise, give the people the name of subjects, even beyond these limitations, if he thinks proper, but still the former can only be called governors, and the latter can only be called subjects in words; for beyond these limitations the relation of governors and subjects ceases in right.” (Rutherford, 1832, p. 456.)
July 2026 marks the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Keep an eye out for more posts like this one that celebrate the Declaration, the lives of its signers, and the world in which they lived.
Secondary Sources:
- Broad, Jacqueline. “Stoicism in Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Moral Philosophy,” Locke Studies vol. 2025 (2025), pp. 1-19.
- Gascoigne, J. (2004, September 23). Rutherforth, Thomas (1712–1771), moral philosopher. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Retrieved 17 Jun. 2026, from https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/
- Haakonssen, Knud. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 1996.
- McDowell, Gary L. “The Limits of Natural Law: Thomas Rutherforth and the American Legal Tradition.” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 37, no. 1 (1992): pp. 57-81.
- Rodell, Jonathan. The rise of Methodism: a study of Bedfordshire, 1736-1851. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2014.
- Trotter, Catharine. The works of Mrs. Catharine Cockburn. Routledge/Thoemmes Press, London, 1992.
- Rutherforth, Thomas. A Vindication of the Right of Protestant Churches to require the Clergy to Subscribe to an Established Confession of Faith and Doctrines, in a Charge Delivered at a Visitation in July 1766. Cambridge: printed by J. Bentham, printer to the University; for Messrs Thurlbourn and Woodyer in Cambridge; and sold by J. Beecroft, and Messrs Robinson and Roberts, C. Bathurst, and T. Cadell, London, 1766.
- Tuck, Richard. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant. New York; Oxford University Press, Oxford [England], 1999.
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